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A through and deck truss bridge originally built by the St. Louis 
& San Francisco Railroad spans Oklahoma’s Kiamichi River 
just south of the Hugo Reservoir Dam in Reach II, subbasin 5. 





The Tarrant Regional Water District (“Tarrant”) is a state-sanctioned entity and water district responsible for providing water to north-central Texas (including the 
cities of Fort Worth, Arlington and Mansfield). Starting in 2000, 
with permission from Texas state government, Tarrant began 
exploring options to obtain and divert Texas’ entitled share of 
water allocated under the Red River Compact (“RRC”) from an 
Oklahoma tributary of the Red River, the Kiamichi River.1 Tarrant 
sought to withdraw this water from Oklahoma’s Kiamichi River, 
before the water entered the Red River since water in the Red 
River is saline and requires significant desalination to make it 
potable.2 In contrast, Kiamichi River water is suitable for domestic 
and industrial use and would not require refining before use. 
While Oklahoma conceded that Texas is entitled to a share 
of water under the RRC — which apportions the Red River’s 
waters among Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas — 
Oklahoma rejected Tarrant’s efforts and barred the entity from 
carrying out its plan. It contended that Texas and its entities 
are not allowed to reach into Oklahoma territory to obtain 
Texas’ water. Oklahoma claimed its sovereignty, language 
of the RRC, state laws not preempted by the RRC, and its 
right to discriminate against out-of-state water users prevent 
Texas from diverting water from within Oklahoma. According 
to Oklahoma, Texas can only appropriate its water once it 
reaches Texas. 
As a result, in 2007, Tarrant sued Oklahoma disputing the 
Sooner state’s interpretation of the RRC. At the heart of the 
dispute was the interpretation of § 5.05(b) of the compact 
focusing on water allocation in Reach II, subbasin 5, which 
encompasses the Red River and its tributaries, including the 
Kiamichi River, from Denison Dam (impounding Lake Texoma) 
to the Arkansas-Louisiana state border.
II. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts are agreements between two or more 
states often used to allocate transboundary waters and 
coordinate flood and pollution prevention measures. The 
Compact Clause of the United States Constitution grants 
states the authority to enter into these agreements so long 
as they begin negotiations with congressional approval and 
subsequently seek congressional ratification.3 Once a compact 
is signed by the compacting states and ratified by Congress, 
the compact becomes federal law.
1. Red River Compact 4  
The RRC was crafted to allocate water from the Red River and 
its tributaries among the four signatory states. Its purpose is 
to promote relationships and remove causes of controversy 
while providing an equitable apportionment of the water. While 
negotiations over the RRC began in 1955, it wasn’t signed until 
1978 and then approved by Congress in 1980. 
The RRC divides the Red River Basin into five major territories 
(each called a “Reach”) and further divides these Reaches 
into topographical subbasins, with each Reach and subbasin 
allocating water differently. Article V of the RRC governs 
allocation from Reach II, subbasin 5, which includes the 
Kiamichi River. Under Article V:
“Signatory States shall have equal rights to 
the use of runoff originating in subbasin 5 and 
undesignated water flowing into subbasin 5, so 
long as the flow of the Red River at the Arkansas-
Louisiana state boundary is 3,000 cubic feet per 
second or more, provided no state is entitled to 
more than 25 percent of the water in excess of 
3,000 cubic feet per second.”5
On June 13, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous 
decision in a “Red River Rivalry” with much greater implications than 
the annual football game. In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, 
the court sided entirely with Oklahoma in that state’s dispute with Texas 
over the allocation of Red River water. This decision will have considerable 
impact on Texas’ ability to meet its ever-growing water needs. Moreover, 
the decision could be consequential for other interstate water compacts and 
the states relying on the rivers and tributaries governed by those agreements.
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Even though each state has an equal right to use the water in 
subbasin 5, the majority of this water is physically located within 
Oklahoma and none in Louisiana.6 Furthermore, as Tarrant 
noted in its petition for writ of certiorari, “Texas does not have 
access to its full apportionment of subbasin 5 water from within 
its borders.”7
2. Parties and the Underlying Lawsuit
Tarrant supplies water to almost two million people in the Fort 
Worth area. By 2060, the district’s water demand is projected 
to exceed supply by roughly 400,000 acre-feet.8 To alleviate the 
growing water demand, Tarrant needs the compacted water.
In 2007, Tarrant filed a permit application with the Oklahoma 
Water Resource Board (“OWRB” or “Oklahoma”) to divert and 
use approximately 310,000 acre-feet per year from the Kiamichi 
River in Reach II, subbasin 5.9 OWRB is the Oklahoma agency 
charged with administering the use, quality and permitting of 
groundwater and surface water in Oklahoma.10
Knowing that the OWRB intended to reject their application, 
Tarrant simultaneously sued OWRB alleging that various 
Oklahoma statutes unjustifiably and unlawfully prevented OWRB 
from issuing Tarrant a permit. In particular, Tarrant argued that 
Oklahoma’s laws were preempted by the RRC and that they 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by restricting interstate 
commerce.11 As the suit commenced, the parties stipulated that 
OWRB would take no official action on the permit applications 
until the litigation was concluded.12
At the Oklahoma District Court, Tarrant sought declaratory 
judgment and an injunction prohibiting OWRB from enforcing 
statutes preventing Tarrant from receiving its share of RRC-
allotted water.13 The court, however, granted OWRB’s summary 
judgment on all of Tarrant’s claims.14 
On Sept. 7, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court decision.15 The Tenth Circuit held that the language 
of the RRC provided clear statements that Congress authorized 
the compacting states to regulate water within its state, even if 
by discriminatory laws favoring in-state users.16 The court also 
rejected Tarrant’s preemption arguments, holding that the equal 
rights of the states to use water in subbasin 5 did not give Texas 
the right to take water from within Oklahoma.17 Concerned 
about the implications this ruling would have on its ability to 
supply North Texans with much needed water, Tarrant appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Graphic courtesy of the Oklahoma Water Resource Board.
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3. Solicitor General’s Review
In an uncommon move for the Supreme Court, before accepting 
the petition for certiorari, the justices asked the solicitor general 
of the United States to file a brief expressing the views of the United 
States. Urging the court to accept Tarrant’s appeal, the solicitor 
suggested that whether Tarrant can obtain water from within 
Oklahoma depends on the interpretation and preemptive effects 
of the RRC.18 The solicitor contended that compacts should be 
interpreted and read as contracts; under his interpretation of 
the RRC, Texas should be allowed to appropriate water from 
within Oklahoma. Additionally, the solicitor asserted that the 
dispute dealt only with RRC interpretation and preemption and 
that the court need not address any Commerce Clause issues.19
III. The Arguments and the
Court’s Decision
The arguments presented before the Supreme Court mostly 
revolve around, and begin with, the language and interpretation 
of the RRC. The three main questions that the parties 
presented included: 1) what is the plain and clear meaning of 
the phrase “equal rights to the use of” as used in § 5.05(b)(1); 
2) whether the RRC preempts state laws; and 3) whether the 
RRC language gave congressional permission for a state to 
discriminate with water.  
1. Language of the RRC
The contention behind this rivalry is how water in Reach II, 
subbasin 5, should be allocated when the RRC provides that 
each state has an “equal right to the use of” the subbasin 
water. The interpretation, intent and effect of this language 
are important for the subsequent preemption and Commerce 
Clause issues. In determining the meaning of this language, 
both parties looked to other sections of the RRC.20 
Both parties agreed that a compact is a contract and 
should be interpreted as one, and like a statute, should be 
interpreted by its plain terms. Tarrant argued that the RRC’s 
language regarding water allocation in subbasin 5 is clear and 
unambiguous, and that the plain terms gave each state 25 
percent of excess runoff water in this subbasin regardless of 
state boundaries. 
Tarrant further argued that § 5.05(b) placed no geographical 
restrictions on the states in obtaining their 25 percent share of 
water, in contrast to other sections of the RRC that specifically 
and expressly limit where a state can obtain its water.21 
Moreover, Tarrant contended that OWRB and the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the RCC (that states can only obtain water 
from within their border) is incorrect because Louisiana would 
never get any of its allocated water since subbasin 5 water is 
situated entirely outside of Louisiana’s territory.22 
In response, OWRB contended that had the parties and 
Congress so intended, the RRC would have explicitly declared 
that one state may enter another state’s territory to obtain its 
share of water; they also argued that where other compacts 
have allowed such incursion, they have always done so with 
specificity.23 Oklahoma believed that the “equal right to use” 
language simply means a state is allocated 25 percent of 
the excess water to use and divert within its own state.24 
Accordingly, Oklahoma argued that because the RRC language 
does not expressly authorize Texas to enter Oklahoma, and 
Texas did not bargain for this right in negotiating the RRC, the 
RRC only allows a state to use its equal share appropriated 
within its own border.25
Siding with Oklahoma, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
RRC’s language to mean that Texas was not permitted to 
enter into Oklahoma territory to obtain its water allotment. In 
reaching its decision, it stated that:
“Three things persuade us that cross-border 
rights were not granted by the Compact: the well-
established principle that States do not easily 
cede their sovereign powers, including their 
control over waters within their own territories; 
the fact that other interstate water compacts 
have treated cross-border rights explicitly; and 
the parties’ course of dealing.”26 
The Court further reasoned that § 5.05(b) of the RRC did 
not provide Texas with a guarantee of a minimum amount of 
water. Rather, it said that amount provided in the provision — 
25 percent of the water in excess of 3,000 cubic feet per 
second — serves as a ceiling. Moreover, it asserted that if 
Texas believed it was not getting its fair share of the excess 
water, its sole remedy was to seek an accounting as provided 
under § 2.11 of the RRC, and based on that accounting, 
demand that Oklahoma desist from taking more than its share.
2. RRC and the Preemption of State Laws
Tarrant also contended that Oklahoma violated sections 
of the RRC by enforcing laws that are “inconsistent” with 
the compact, namely, statutes that prohibited Texas from 
withdrawing water from within Oklahoma and transporting 
it to Texas. It also argued, as did the solicitor general, that 
the “presumption against preemption” should not apply. 
Normally, when federal law is forced upon a state, there is a 
presumption that the federal law does not preempt state law. 
However, when a state voluntarily consents and enters into a 
compact allocating natural resources, Tarrant asserted that 
the presumption should not apply.27 Therefore, according to 
Tarrant, any Oklahoma statute preventing Texas from obtaining 
its water should be deemed preempted by the RRC.
The basis of Tarrant’s claim, however, was grounded on 
its belief that it was entitled to a certain quantity of water 
from subbasin 5. Given that the Court had dismissed this 
interpretation of the RRC and ruled that the compact does not 
create any cross-border rights, the Court rejected Tarrant’s 
preemption analysis outright.
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3. The Right to Discriminate Against 
Interstate Commerce
Finally, the Supreme Court was also asked 
to address whether clear congressional 
consent was given to the signatory states 
to pass and enforce discriminatory laws 
burdening interstate commerce. This 
required consideration of the “equal rights” 
language and other sections in the RRC 
providing that compact obligations shall 
not interfere with a state’s appropriation, 
control, and use of water that is not 
inconsistent with the compact. 
Tarrant argued that certain Oklahoma 
statutes are discriminatory and have 
effectively resulted in an embargo 
on out-of-state water transactions.28 
According to Tarrant, for a state to favor 
its own citizens and discriminate against 
citizens of other states, a compact 
must include a clear statement showing 
Congress’ “clear and unambiguous 
intent” to permit the use of protectionist 
and discriminatory laws, which would 
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. 
In addition, Tarrant asserted that 
the Supreme Court’s Sporhase case 
addressed this issue when the Court 
struck down similar Nebraska laws that 
prohibited out-of-state groundwater 
transfers.29 In Sporhase, the Court 
said that Nebraska’s reliance on broad 
statutory language and interstate 
compacts, containing language similar 
to that used in the RRC, did not evidence 
clear congressional intent to remove 
the federal constraints on such state 
laws.30 Tarrant argued that the scattered 
language in the RRC does not show the 
clear and unambiguous intent required for 
a state to pass and enforce protectionist 
laws favoring its own citizens. 
In response, Oklahoma contended that 
Sporhase is distinguishable because 
it addressed groundwater rather than 
surface waters, and that there had not 
been an interstate compact allocating 
the groundwater at issue in that case. 
Furthermore, Oklahoma argued that 
the Tenth Circuit correctly found the 
required clear congressional intent 
for Oklahoma’s water embargo in four 
provisions of the RRC.31 Accordingly, 
Oklahoma contended that because 
Congress adopted the RRC as federal 
law, the RRC explicitly carves out an 
exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and allows states to pass laws 
protecting and favoring its citizens. 
In considering Tarrant’s contentions, 
the Supreme Court again referred to 
its conclusion that § 5.05(b) of the RRC 
does not afford Texas a guaranteed 
volume of water. Accordingly, because 
Texas is not entitled to water from 
within Oklahoma, it has not suffered any 
discrimination as an out-of-state user 
participating in interstate commerce. 
The Court asserted that under § 
5.05(b), all water exceeding Oklahoma’s 
25 percent share in excess of the 3,000 
CFS base amount is allotted to Oklahoma 
“unless and until another state calls for 
an accounting and Oklahoma is asked 
to refrain from utilizing more than its 
entitled share.” In effect, discrimination 
against Texas could only be proven 
through an accounting showing that 
Oklahoma used more than its allotment 
of the excess water and that Texas 
was somehow prevented from using 
its share of that excess water. In the 
absence of an accounting and evidence 
of discrimination, the Court deemed 
Tarrant’s claim without merit.
IV. Implications of the 
      Court’s Decision
The consequences of the Court’s 
decision are not insignificant. For the 
Tarrant Regional Water District as well as 
for the whole of Texas, the outcome will 
make it more difficult to enjoy and utilize 
water allotted to the state under the RRC. 
While Texas does have rights to excess 
water in subbasin 5 (as well as rights to 
Red River water from other subbasins), 
it will have to obtain its allotment from 
the more salty Red River rather than 
from fresher tributaries flowing within 
Oklahoma. The cost of desalinating that 
water now will be one of the challenges 
that Tarrant will have to evaluate when 
considering whether to use Red River 
water as a source of potable water.
Related to this challenge, and an issue 
left unsettled by the Court, is the 
manner in which Texas would access its 
share of excess water from subbasin 5. 
Under agreements predating the RRC, 
Oklahoma actually “owns” both banks 
of the Red River up to the vegetation 
Graphic courtesy of Tarrant Regional Water District.
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line on the river’s southern shore. Since, under this decision, 
Texas may not enter Oklahoma to obtain its share of subbasin 
5 water without Oklahoma’s consent, it is unclear how Texas 
would access its water allotment.
From a broader perspective, the decision has likely raised 
the barrier for future challenges to interstate compacts by 
compact members seeking access to cross-border water 
resources. In ruling for Oklahoma, the Court’s decision 
suggests a presumption that expectations in property 
interests established under interstate water compacts are 
“reasonable” ones that should be protected. In a prior case, the 
Supreme Court stated, “We have recognized the importance of 
honoring reasonable expectations in property interests. But 
such expectations can only be of consequence where they 
are ‘reasonable’ ones.”32 Given the scope of property rights 
created by interstate compacts and related state water laws, 
the presumption of reasonableness will be a daunting hurdle 
to overcome and could have serious consequences for other 
interstate compact challenges, including Texas’ recently filed 
Supreme Court case against New Mexico over the 1938 Rio 
Grande Compact.
In the final analysis, the most important lesson resulting from 
the Red River Rivalry may not be found in the Court’s opinion. 
Rather, it is likely located in the Court’s nearly century-old 
admonition that state riparians to interstate waters, whether or 
not governed by an interstate compact, should always look to 
cooperative study, conference and mutual concessions before 
beginning judicial proceedings.33 Having spent $6 million on 
its failed lawsuit, Tarrant must now redouble its efforts to 
negotiate a truce with its neighbors across the river and seek 
a viable water supply solution for north-central Texas. Careful 
negotiating of new compacts or amendments to existing 
agreements may be the few avenues left to Tarrant to acquire 
new water sources. The same can be said for all of the thirsty 
states across our nation.
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Graphic courtesy of Tarrant Regional Water District.
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